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THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND ITS 
INCONSISTENT APPROACH TO THE DOCTRINE  
OF DIRECT EFFECT
The issue pertaining to the circumstances under which individuals may 
seek enforcement of EU directives has proven to be one of the most contro-
versial areas of EU law [17, p. 328]. This is primarily due to the Court of 
Justice’s approach to and application of the principles surrounding this 
practice. This article will critically consider the development and current 
application of the doctrine of direct effect in a bid to determine whether 
there is any justification for the Court’s approach to the matter. It will ulti-
mately be argued that there is no apparent justification for the Court’s in-
consistent and arbitrary application of the doctrine and that this therefore 
undermines the underlying purpose of the doctrine: to protect individuals 
from Community law violations. 
There is no express statement in the EC Treaty that Community law 
should be given direct effect. However, it has long been recognised since 
the landmark decision of Van Gen den Loos that the terminology of the 
Treaty is capable of granting individuals rights which must be protected by 
national courts [18, p. 12]. This principle was then expanded in Grad so that 




prominently directives. This was confirmed in Van Duyn in which it was 
held that directives could be directly applied because otherwise their under-
lying purpose ’would be weakened if individuals were prevented from tak-
ing…[them]…into consideration as an element of Community law’ [23, p. 
12]. This approach appears to be based on the need to ensure the effective-
ness of EU law and the principle that private individuals have an important 
role in facilitating legal order within the Community [11, p. 1055; 1, p. 513]. 
Despite the importance that was attached to direct effect in Van Duyn, the 
circumstances under which it is available have been limited to vertical direct 
effect and cases in which a directive is sufficiently clear, precise and uncon-
ditional [13, p. 94].
In Marshall it was emphasised that although directives could have verti-
cal direct effect, they could not have horizontal direct effect [7, p. 34]. The 
Court held that an NHS retirement policy violated Directive 76/207 and, in 
interpreting Article 288 TFEU, stressed that ’the binding nature of a directive, 
which constitutes the basis for the possibility of relying on the directive before 
a national court, exists only in relation to each member State to which it is 
addressed’ and it could therefore not be relied upon by individuals [27, p. 48]. 
Due to the principle that duties presuppose rights, individuals cannot be 
granted rights under directives if they do not impose duties upon them because 
holding private parties responsible for state failures to implement directives 
is potentially unfair [8, p. 867]. Yet the formalist rationales that emerge in 
Marshall are unpersuasive, particularly if they are compared to the Court’s 
purposive approach in Defrenne. The Court in Defrenne held that direct effect 
extends to include the actions of private parties (in this case a private com-
pany) despite the fact that the provision concerned was only addressed to 
member states [12, pp. 201–202]. Thus emerges the inconsistent nature of this 
decision and the Court’s interpretation of Article 288 TFEU which only con-
cerns member states [5, p. 861]. Article 288 moreover does not stipulate that 
directives are exclusively binding upon member states; it simply states that 
directives bind the member states to which it is addressed [4, p. 351]. Despite 
the clear problems that arise from this decision the Court has confirmed its 
continued relevance and stipulated in Faccini Dori that directives cannot have 
horizontal direct effect. 




having horizontal direct effect allows discrimination to manifest between the 
private and public sectors [15, p. 401]. Article 288 TFEU does not expressly 
define ’state’ and although it is traditionally limited to judicial, legislative and 
executive institutions, the CJEU has clearly adopted both expansive and re-
strictive approaches in case law. The Court in Foster v British Gas for ex-
ample adopted an expansive approach to the application of directives, sug-
gesting that the concept of public entity is sufficiently expansive to include 
a variety of institutions that are under some form or other of state control [28, 
p. 18]. The Court therefore extended the protection available to individuals. 
This does not however mean that the problematic distinction between private 
and public bodies has been eliminated [19, p. 118]. The Court’s approach 
following Foster has been irregular at best. In Doughty v Rolls Royce for 
example Rolls Royce was not defined as a public body because it was not 
deemed to provide a public service despite the fact that the majority of the 
company was state-owned.
Perhaps most prominently, decisions such as Marshall may be criticised 
on the grounds that they result in arbitrary differences in the protection that 
is given to individuals whose rights have been violated by a public author-
ity and a private individual [10, p. 587]. Such arbitrary inequality is illus-
trated in Duke v Reliance in which the facts of the case were similar to that 
of Marshall although the directive could not be relied on because the claim-
ant’s employer was a private body. The Court recognised that such a problem 
could develop although it dismissed this issue on the grounds that ’such 
a distinction may be easily avoided if the Member State concerned has cor-
rectly implemented the directive in national law’ [27, p. 51]. The Court 
however appears to mistakenly presume that directives may only be inten-
tionally rather than mistakenly implemented incorrectly [6, p. 88]. This 
essentially means that individuals residing in states that have not fully imple-
mented directives will be unevenly protected. Additionally, due to the fact 
that directives are a core mechanism for the imposition of responsibilities 
relating to welfare, directives geared towards the specific aim of welfare and 
social policy are undermined by the Court’s approach. Hindering the right 
of individuals to challenge private parties clearly dilutes the fulfilment of 
the Community’s objectives [10, p. 589]. 
It has been argued that giving directives horizontal direct effect would 
result in legal uncertainty because it blurs the distinction between direc-
tives and regulations [16, p. 250]. This was however dismissed in Vaneet-
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veld on the grounds that member states still control the way that directives 
are implemented [31, p. 25]. The Court in Francovich sought to ease its 
previously harsh and inconsistent approach. Thus was created the doctrine 
of state liability which stipulates that member states must compensate 
individuals for any losses that result from the state’s failure to fully or 
properly implement a directive [2, p. 441]. When individuals cannot rely 
on the horizontal application of a particular directive they may therefore 
seek damages from the state [9, p. 862]. Yet once again the Court has re-
stricted the availability of this remedy by imposing certain criteria; it is 
therefore not a remedy that is available to all individuals who are unable 
to enforce their directive rights. 
The Court’s inconsistent approach to the doctrine of direct effect becomes 
all the more perplexing when one considers its willingness to directly apply 
directives between private parties. In such cases the existence of a discrep-
ancy between national law and a directive are typically settled in favour of 
the directive, regardless of whether the claim is vertical or horizontal [4, p. 
6]. This was the approach adopted in Bellone v Yokohama for example, in 
which the Court upheld an individual’s claim that a national law was in breach 
of Directive 86/653 because it rejected the validity of her agency contract. 
The Court however reasoned that the decision sought to coordinate member 
state laws rather than to interfere in the legal relationship between private 
parties [10, p. 589].
Bellone may however be contrasted to CIA Security in which the Court 
allowed a directive to be enforced in a dispute between private parties. This 
decision – as well as Bellone – suggests that directives may only be directly 
enforced between private parties if they concern the core goal(s) of the par-
ticular directive [1, p. 513]. This approach is indeed arbitrary at best and de-
pends ultimately on the Court’s interpretation of any particular directive’s core 
goals. This situation has been rendered all the more complicated following 
Mangold in which the Court allowed a claimant to rely on a directive despite 
the fact that the dispute was horizontal and that the deadline for the directive’s 
implementation had not yet expired. The Court arguably expanded the hori-
zontal effect of directives much too broadly, which is clearly an approach that 
is at odds with previous case law [3, p. 337]. Mangold also essentially means 
that private parties will need to consider ’the abstract and unwritten general 
principles of EU law in order to see if the national provisions are compatible 
with them’ [14, p. 444].
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It is therefore evident that the Court has indeed undermined the doctrine 
of direct effect due to its inconsistent and unpredictable decisions on the mat-
ter. There is consequently uncertainty as to when directives may be horizon-
tally relied upon. The body of case law on the matter is incoherent, allowing 
and then disallowing direct effect in horizontal disputes. Reform is clearly 
necessary in order to clarify the circumstances in which directives may be 
enforced against private parties. Until such reform takes place, the doctrine 
of direct effect will continue to be undermined by the inconsistent and am-
biguous approach of the Court. 
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